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Abstract
The board of directors is a collective body that should act in the best interest of shareholders. The board requires the combination 
of executive and non-executive directors to pursue the shareholders’ interest. The non-executive directors on the board will not 
be able to exercise their duties effectively, unless they are independence from management and ensure they provides unbiased 
business judgment. Independent directors are the person entrusted by shareholders to represent them and will help to reduce 
agency problems. Further, the Code of Corporate Governance and regulators recommend the composition of board members 
should be balanced and consist of independent directors. However, mere compliance with the recommendations is not enough if 
the independent directors fail to exercise their functions effectively. A study has been carried out in a few countries by examining 
board independence and firm performance. The results showed a mixed association between proportions of independent directors 
and firm performance. Although the companies comprised the highest number of independent directors, it would not assure to 
enhance firm performance. Thus, the existence of independent directors on board should be monitored in order to bring positive 
shareholder values.
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1. Introduction
At present, most organizations realize the essential roles played by the independent directors ever since the 
collapse of many big companies such as Enron and WorldCom. The important role of the non-executive directors is 
discussed in the 1992 Cadbury Report and the Tyson Report in the year 2003. The 1992 Cadbury Report has raised 
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attention on the effectiveness of the board directors as important corporate governance mechanisms. Later, the 2003 
Tyson Report focused on the requirements and development of the roles of non-executive directors who were 
required to possess broad and diverse knowledge, to enhance board effectiveness.
The major contribution of the board is formulating company’s strategy and exercise proper oversight function 
throughout company operations (Zinkin, 2010). Independent directors could contribute their independent views and 
actively participate in board discussion. They will represent shareholders on the company’s board. As independence 
person, they must ensure their presence and performance free from any influence of insiders or management. The 
company appoints independent directors to monitor the performance of executive directors and top managements. 
Therefore, they would pursue the interest of shareholders by maximizing shareholders’ value. Zinkin (2010) has 
stated that several areas should be addressed by independent directors that would contribute to the effective 
formulation of the company strategy. They should ask questions pertaining to the businesses that the company 
ventures in, product market segmentation, and the valuable customers within the market segmentation (Fuzi, Rahim 
and Tan, 2012). Independent directors with relevant industry background and wide expertise would be more willing 
to challenge Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and the management team in board discussion.
The independent directors are required by Bursa Malaysia in the composition of board member and board 
committees. For instance, all members of the audit committee must be non-executive directors by the majority of 
them are independent. These to ensure the independent directors would protect the interest of shareholders from 
management controlled. Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) 2012 has taken an effort to reinforce 
board independence in the company through several recommendations. The Code emphasizes on the composition of 
nomination committee, which should comprise of a majority of independent directors. Further, if the chairman of the 
company is not independent, the majority members of the board must be independence and board should review the 
independence of its independent directors annually. The purpose of this paper is to review some of the literatures on 
the board independence and firm performance which has been studied across the world. This is to testify whether the 
existence of independent directors on the board may lead to positive associations with firm performance.
2. Board Structure and Composition
In Malaysia, most companies are practicing the one-tier board which comprises of the non-executive directors and 
the executive directors. The non-executive directors are not the full-time employees as compared to the executive 
directors who are full-time employees and are involved in the day-to-day operation of the company. The role of the 
non-executive directors was as a monitoring mechanism for the performance and activities of executive directors 
and management. In general, the representation of non-executive directors was vital for the board’s effectiveness. 
Therefore, the total board should consist of one-third of non-executive directors. This requirement is enforced by the 
Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirement in order for the board to be effective. When having only one non-executive 
director on the board, the director would not be able to challenge the actions of other board members and would tend 
to follow the majority.
In the previous studies, the board composition in Malaysian context comprised of a sufficient number of 
independent directors on the board, whether before the Asian Financial Crisis 1997-1998 or after the Crisis. 
Abdullah (2004), did his study of the roles of board independence and Chief Executive Duality on firm performance 
of the companies on the main Board of KLSE for the financial year between1994-1996. In the study, he found that 
the structures of the board in Malaysia for the three years period were dominated by the outside directors who are 
free from management. Thus, it means that the importance of independent directors has been realized even before 
the crisis.
After the Asian Financial Crisis, the other study on board composition also found that the board composition 
constitutes an adequate number of independent directors as stipulated in the MCCG 2000 that non-executive director 
should represent one-third of total board members. The study done by Wooi and Ming (2009) on 21 Malaysian 
Government-Linked Companies (GLCs) listed on Bursa Malaysia Main Board in year 2004 indicated that board 
independence ratio was 39.5% which is above the minimum requirement by Securities Commission as that of 33% 
of total board.
Similarly, in the study on 81 property sector companies listed on the main board of Bursa Malaysia for the period 
1999 to 2005, the board composition was made up about 63.4% of non-executive directors (Shakir, 2010).
Therefore, it showed the awareness of the Malaysian public listed companies on the essential requirement of 
independent directors on the board. However, if the independent directors just merely exist and do not perform the 
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expected roles as required by shareholders, then the functions of independent directors will be ineffective. A 
sufficient number of independent directors on the board did not determine such directors were able to perform their 
roles effectively. This could be seen when the Asian Financial Crisis occurred, which gave a significant impact to 
the corporate sector.
3. Board Independence
Berghe and Baelden (2005) examined the issue of independence as an important factor in ensuring board 
effectiveness through the monitoring and strategic roles of the directors. The ultimate factor for the board 
independence is by acquiring enough numbers of the independent directors on board. They stated that the director’s 
ability, willingness and board environment might lead to the independent attitude of each director.
Kakabadse, Yang and Sanders (2010) narrated the effectiveness of non-executive directors in China is determined 
by their formal independence, information accessibility, incentives provided and competency. However, they found 
out that the non-executive director system in China was weak because there was too much intervention of 
controlling shareholders and there was a lack of understanding of the functions of non-executive directors.
Johari, Saleh, Jaffar and Hassan (2008) indicated that the minimum composition of the independent director by 
the Malaysia Code of Corporate Governance is still not adequate enough to monitor the management. They 
concluded that the composition of the independent directors on the board was not associated with earning 
management. They found out that most of the firms in Malaysia have 1/3 or 33% of the independent directors on the 
board, but it did not have any effect on the earning management. Besides, Wooi and Ming (2009) indicated that the 
independent directors have failed in their internal monitoring role in Malaysian Government Linked Companies 
(GLCs).
Nowak and McCabe (2008) have studied the roles of the independent directors in Australian public listed 
companies by interviewing 30 directors. The participating directors agreed that a majority of non-executive directors 
(NEDs) on the board would provide a safeguard for a balance of power or management relationship. Besides that, 
there was a distinction between the boards with independent non-executive directors and non-independent directors. 
Independent directors would provide a variety of independent thinking, and majority of them could reduce the 
dangers of ‘group think’.
Some researchers also analysed the relationship of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) with the board’s 
independence. Abdullah (2004) indicated there was no association between the board’s independence and the CEO’s 
duality with performance. Conversely, Byrd, Cooperman and Wolfe (2010) found a relationship between the 
attendance of outside directors and the payment of CEO remunerations for United State banking sectors. When the 
outside directors attend at least 75 percent of the board meetings, the CEO remuneration would be low. The 
independent directors who were regularly attending meetings would be better in monitoring of excessive payment to 
the CEO.
A study by Ararat, Orbay and Yurtoglu (2010) on the board independence in controlled firms in Turkey found 
three main important findings. The first finding indicated there was no significant effect of board independence and 
equity issue. Besides, the independent directors in Turkey were less efficient in restraining related party transactions. 
Also, they found that there was a negative relationship and a non-relationship of independent directors and firm’s 
performance. The results were due to the fact that independent directors of Turkey’s listed companies were not truly 
independent. The independent directors had personal, financial, and social ties with the dominant shareholders and 
this influenced their independent judgement, thus jeopardizing their functioning as independent directors.
4. Relationship between Board Independence and Firm Performance
The term independent directors were used interchange with term non-executive directors and outside directors. 
However, not all non-executive directors are independent. The study on board independence and firm performance 
showed mixed results; either positive, negative or no relationship with firm performance. Few studies also look at 
the relationship between board independence and earning management. Firm performance is studied by using 
market-based measure or accounting based measures. The accounting based measure through Return on Assets 
(ROA), Return on Investment (ROI), earnings per share and profit measures. Meanwhile, market-based measure 
carried out in many studies by using Tobin’s q for market value.
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The study in India showed that by having board independence did not guarantee to improve firm performance 
due to poor monitoring roles of independent directors (Garg, 2007). One of the vital roles of independent directors is 
to monitor the company’s performance and operation. Effective monitoring mechanism in the firm could reduce 
agency problems. Thus, the company should appoint independent directors who could exercise proper oversight 
function in monitoring governance, internal control and risk management. Similarly, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) 
found out no relation between firm performance and the proportion of outside directors. The study used the Tobin’s 
q to measure the firm performance by using mixes market-based and accounting based measures.
Epps and Ismail (2009) indicated that firms in United States with annually elected boards, small size boards, 
100 percent independent nominating committees, and 100 percent independent compensation committees have more 
negative discretionary accruals. Similar with Cybinski and Windsor (2013), the independence remuneration 
committee may align CEO remuneration with firm performance in larger Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) as 
compared to smaller and medium ASX300 firms. It showed that independent directors were having a crucial 
function of the monitoring remuneration process of CEOs and executive directors for larger public companies, and 
later the remuneration paid to them commensurate with their performance.
This is similar to the results found on the association of the board independence and the earning management 
(Johari, Saleh, Jaafar & Hassan, 2008). It showed that the board’s independence was not associated with the earning 
management even though the proportion of independent directors on the board was one-third of the total majority. 
This means that even though the company had many independent directors on the board, it would not increase 
shareholders’ return. Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2006) concluded that Malaysian companies had 
insignificant relationship between other corporate governance mechanisms such as the independence of the board, 
and the audit committee with the earnings management. It relates to the ineffectiveness of the board directors in 
their monitoring roles due to the dominant role of the manager and the executive directors in board matters.
In Hong Kong firms, study on board committee independence and firm performance in family firm showed no 
association. However, there is a positive relationship between board independence and firm performance in non-
family firms (Leung, Richardson and Jaggi, 2013). It is due to the minority of independent directors in family firms 
as compared to non-family firms. The recommendation by regulators on composition of independent directors on 
board is voluntary basis. If the company could not comply, they may explain for the non-compliance. From the 
results, the independent directors’ views would help companies to improve their corporate performance.
In contrast, a research was carried out by Abdullah (2004) in the year 1996. The study measured the 
relationship between the percentages of independent directors at 412 Companies in the Main Board of KLSE with 
the firm’s performance. It showed positive and significant correlation with returns on assets, profit margin and 
earnings per share. From that finding, it showed that the board’s independence might contribute to the effective 
performance of a firm. It showed evidences that the high number of independent directors on the board influenced 
the company’s financial performance.
Therefore, it is essential to have independent directors on the board since it resulted in better firm performance. 
This is parallel to the functions of the independent directors to maximize shareholders’ wealth. Ameer, Ramli and 
Zakaria (2009) have studied the association between the board composition and firm’s performance of the 277 non-
financial listed Malaysian Companies. They found out that over the period of 2002 to 2007, companies with high 
representation of outside and foreign directors on the board had a significant correlation with the company’s better 
performance. They segregated the board into four types. They were classified as “bullies”, “buddies”, “believers”, 
and “best of all”. They found out most of the firm’s board over that period could be classified as the “bullies”, and 
the percentage of the insider directors were more than 50 percent of the total board. A study of 279 Malaysian firms 
listed on the KLSE and 271 Singapore firms listed on the Singapore Stock exchange for the year 2000 showed the 
proportion of independent directors on the Audit Committee is significant and negatively related to abnormal 
accruals (Bradbury, Mak and Tan, 2006). This means that the higher the number of independent directors on the 
audit committee, the lower the abnormal accruals which are associated with the roles of the independent directors 
when present in audit committee.
The study on company listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange from the period 2007-2011 showed a 
significant negative association between the number of non-executive directors and firm performance (Fitriya Fauzi 
and Locke, 2012). It means the greater in the number of non-executive directors on the board, the lower the firm 
performance. The negative association may be due to high block holders’ own, which makes non-executive directors 
become powerless in board discussion. However, they found out a significant positive association between the non-
executive directors and Return on Assets (ROA). The non-executive directors on the board may ensure management 
uses the company’s assets efficiently to generate income. A studied done in Pakistani’s board also found a negative 
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association between the proportion of outside directors and corporate performance. It is due to the small number of 
outside directors on the board (Sheikh, Wang and Khan, 2013).
Board independence ensured good corporate governance practice by the companies. Foo and Zain (2010) 
studied the sample of 481 Public-Listed firms in Malaysia at the end of the year 2007 for board independence, board 
diligence and liquidity. There was a significant association between the board independence and the disclosure of 
information. It means when the board was independent, it would be more transparent and would disseminate 
information which later results in improving the firm’s liquidity.
5. Conclusion
The representation of independent directors on the board should show a positive relation to the firm’s 
performance. If there were no association or negative relationship with the firm’s performance, the performance of 
such independent directors on the board were jeopardized. Wang and Oliver (2009) mentioned that the company 
might comply with the required number of the independent directors on the board, but several tactics were done to 
neutralize the powers of such directors. The executive directors might appoint someone that has had experience in 
passive board, irrelevant background or without knowledge to challenge the executive powers. With regard to the 
mixed results of the relationship between independent directors and firm’s performance, Wallison (2006) argued 
that having independent directors on the board was not for better performance but for better governance. They 
would represent shareholders to monitor the activities of management and executive directors in raising company’s 
performance. Therefore, the executive directors would not have any chance to do any wrongdoings in their self-
interest.
The company applies good governance is not only to bring profit to the company, but it will enhance corporate social 
performance. In the stakeholder value approach, companies should exercise its corporate accountability to various 
companies’ stakeholders. It has shifted from protecting shareholders’ interest in preserving stakeholders’ interest. The 
interests of stakeholders are various and company must know how to consider the interests. The independent directors on 
the board would monitor the company performance in order to ensure the company’s strategy should also consider in 
stakeholders’ interest not on the management interest.
Using data from the manufacturing firm which listed in the Compustat S & P 500, board independence has a 
significant positive association of performance of firms pursuing a strategy on cost efficiency rather than strategy on 
innovation (Gani and Jermias, 2006). Meanwhile, the higher proportion of outside directors on the board can 
monitor the opportunistic behaviour of top management and mitigate the agency problem (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Board independence also can help to mitigate bad corporate reputation due to the disclosure of information to 
shareholders (Zhang, 2012). Further, a previous study by Dunn and Sainty (2009) on the relationship of the board 
characteristics and corporate social performance, showed a positive relationship. A quantitative survey of 104 
Canadians firms showed that the company with a large number of independent directors on the board was more 
socially responsible. The company would be more aware and more sensitive to the needs of other stakeholders and 
also have a greater social responsiveness.
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